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CONCLUSION
The utility of the six-months rule has suffered from a failure by
many courts to properly analyze the basis of the rule. The rule is
designed to protect the public's interest in the continued operation of
the nation's railroads by assuring payment of operations creditors de-
spite the precarious credit position of many railroads. The courts
should not render illusory the protection offered by the rule by the ap-
plication of inappropriate accounting standards; nor should the rule's
purpose be compromised by the improper exclusion of the cost of nec-
essary new purchases, or the inappropriate inclusion of charges for
such items as depreciation. The six-months rule has not lost its rele-
vance in the one hundred years since its inception-it has merely been
misapplied.
ALAN E. KR AUS
Copyright Law--One Step Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Public
Interest Qualification Premised On The First Amendment
In keeping with the copyright clause of the United States Consti-
tution,' the purpose of the copyright statute2 is to enhance the public
welfare by promoting the growth of learning and culture.3 To accom-
plish this purpose, Congress has accorded the copyright holder certain
This Note has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
2. Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-
810 (West 1977)). The Copyrights Act of 1976 revised Title 17 of the United States Code (gov-
erning copyrights) in its entirety. The new provisions became effective January 1, 1978, except §§
118, 304(b) and 801, which became effective October 19, 1976. The substantive issues discussed in
this Note concerning provisions of the former copyright statute are equally relevant to the new
provisions.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909) (copyright act intended "not pri-
marily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public"). See also Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm.




quasi-exclusive rights in his copyrighted work,4 providing thereby an
economic incentive for both the creation and the distribution of intel-
lectual and cultural works.' These rights are not absolute;6 traditional
copyright qualifications such as the doctrine of fair use7 prevent the
copyright owner from exercising total control over his work. There re-
main a few situations, however, in which the traditional qualifications
do not prevent the economic interests of the copyright owner from
overshadowing the public's interest in the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information and commentary. When the material is of such a
nature that it cannot be reduced to an assortment of facts or ideas,9 it is
clear that the copyright owner may prohibit any use of his copyrighted
work that might reasonably be expected to diminish its potential mar-
ketability- even though the proposed use may be of benefit to the pub-
lic welfare.1" For this reason, both courts and commentators have
begun to suggest that the copyright monopoly be further narrowed by
adoption of a direct public interest factor,' I founded either on the con-
stitutional purpose of the copyright statute1 2 or on the first amendment
4. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-118 (West 1977).
5. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
6. The monopoly given the copyright owner is limited in duration. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West
1977) (life of the author plus 50 years). The copyright statute is not intended to prohibit copying
that is neither substantial nor material. A. LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY
No. 14 (1958), prepared for and reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss. (Comm. Print 1960) reprinted
in 2 STUD. COPYRIGHT 781, 784 (1963). The copyright does not extend to facts or ideas contained
in the copyrighted work. Id; Sobel, Copyright and the FirstAmendment:A Gathering Storm?, 19
ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 50 (1971).
7. The fair use doctrine allows for the reasonable and fair use of copyrighted material. See
2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1976 & Supp. 1976); Cohen, supra note 3. "Fair
use may be defined as a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright, to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner by the copyright." A. LATMAN, supra note 6, at 783 (quoting BALL, THE LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). The fair use doctrine was codified by the new
Copyrights Act at 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977). Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
8. See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
9. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hill v. Whalen & Mar-
tell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
11. See general l Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675,
678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 9.2; Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 991 (1970); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of
%Fair Use" in the Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790, 807 (1975).
12. See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
152 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
right of the public to be fully informed.13 In the copyright infringement
case of Meeropol v. Nizer,'4 however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, when presented with the opportunity, re-
fused to recognize or apply this direct public interest qualification.
Instead, the court relied upon traditional copyright law concepts and
found plaintiffs' economic interest in the copyright superior to defend-
ants' claim of fair use.' 5 The court's holding represents a distinct depar-
ture from the trend toward recognition of a direct public interest
qualification that had begun to emerge in the Second Circuit.'
6
The Meeropol case concerned The Implosion Conspiracy, 17 a book
about the Ethel and Julius Rosenberg espionage trial, in which the au-
thor, Louis Nizer, quoted from twenty-eight letters that had been pub-
lished previously in a copyrighted book.'8 The present owners of the
copyright to this book of letters (the Rosenbergs' children, Robert and
Michael Meeropol) brought suit in federal district court against Nizer
and his publishers alleging that Nizer had infringed their statutory cop-
yright.' 9 In response, Nizer and his codefendants asserted that their use
of the quotations was both fair and reasonable and, therefore, permissi-
ble under the fair use doctrine, and on this ground moved for summary
judgment.20 After comparing the two books in question, the district
court concluded that defendants had successfully established the de-
fense of fair use2 and granted their motion for summary judgment.2
13. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
14. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978).
15. Id at 1070.
16. Though the Second Circuit had not adopted an express public interest qualification, the
court had begun to give more consideration to the public interest and had revealed some inclina-
tion to consider the first amendment's relation to the copyright laws. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec.,
Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978).
17. L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973).
18. THE DEATH HOUSE LETTERS OF ETHEL AND JULIUS ROSENBERG (1953).
19. 560 F.2d at 1063. The original complaint also alleged invasion of privacy and defama-
tion and infringement of common law copyright. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the dis-
missal of these claims. Id.
20. Id. at 1064. Defendants' original motion for summary judgment was denied without
prejudice. 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Defendants subsequently renewed their
motion for summary judgment on the basis of an expanded record. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
As additional defenses, defendants asserted that a significant part of the allegedly appropri-
ated material was already in the public domain, that plaintiffs were not the true copyright owners,
and that plaintiffs should be barred by laches from bringing the action. 361 F. Supp. at 1065.
21. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
22. Id. at 1215. Plaintiffs waived their right to trial by jury against defendants Nizer and
Doubleday & Co., Inc. but not as to defendant Fawcett Publications, Inc., id at 1211, leading the
trial court to find that the fair use defense was available to Nizer and Doubleday & Co., Inc., both
as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.
COPYPIGHT
In analyzing the fair use issue, the court gave primary consideration to
the fact that the public interest in understanding all facets of the Rosen-
berg case would be served by publication of Nizer's book.23 The poten-
tially adverse effect of the use on the future marketability of the
copyrighted letters was not considered sufficient to preclude defendants
from invoking fair use as a defense.24
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, disagreed
with the trial court's resolution of this apparent conflict between the
respective interests of the public and the copyright owners. Rejecting
the trial court's finding that the public's interest in the historical event
was sufficient to establish the fair use defense regardless of the apparent
economic harm to the copyright owners,25 the court reversed the grant
of summary judgment in defendants' favor and remanded the case.26
The court of appeals' decision is consistent with the traditional ap-
plication of the fair use doctrine. Though originally developed as a
means of qualifying the exclusive rights of the copyright holder and
protecting the interest of the public in the dissemination of learning
and culture,27 the doctrine of fair use was never intended to benefit the
public welfare at the expense of the copyright owner's economic inter-
ests.28 In determining whether the use made of copyrighted material in
a particular case is a fair use, the courts generally have considered a
number of factors; 29 it is evident from the case law, however, that the
ultimate consideration is whether the unauthorized use tends to
diminish or prejudice the potential marketability of the copyrighted
23. Id at 1207.
24. Id at 1210.
25. 560 F.2d at 1070.
26. Id at 1071.
27. Cohen, supra note 3, at 49.
28. See generally cases cited note 10 supra.
29. The factors listed by the Second Circuit in Meeropol are the same as those found in the
recent codification of the fair use doctrine at 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977):
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
560 F.2d at 1069.
Commentators on the fair use doctrine have suggested various sets of criteria that are essen-
tially variations of the four factors listed above. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPY-
RIGHT 309-10 (2d ed. 1960); Cohen, supra note 3, at 53; Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI.
L. REv. 203, 213 (1954). These lists have not been particularly helpful, however, because the
criteria are defined only in general terms without specification of their relative weights. See
Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 87.
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material.30 Consideration of the purpose and character of the use has
sometimes served to broaden the application of the fair use exception
in the case of so-called "scholarly" works.3' It has been acknowledged
that the public's interest in the advancement of such fields as science,
law, medicine, history and biography often can be served only through
the use of previously copyrighted materials.32  This public interest fac-
tor, however, has not been found sufficient to support alone the defense
of fair use when the subsequent scholarly work might decrease the po-
tential value of the copyrighted work:33 a use having such an effect can-
not be "fair" to the copyright owner because it undermines the
economic incentive to discovery and creation that is the very basis of
the quasi-monopolistic copyright system.34
Until the Meeropol case, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had appeared to favor recognition of a direct public
interest factor as a possible defense in a copyright infringement ac-
tion." In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. ,36 the court
gave scant consideration to the possibility that the future market for
copyrighted magazine articles about Howard Hughes might be dimin-
ished by the unauthorized use of the articles in a subsequent biogra-
phy.37 Instead, the court turned its attention to the nature of the
materials, focusing on the issues of whether the copying work would
serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information and
whether its preparation required some use of previously copyrighted
materials.38 Though the Rosemont court couched its opinion in terms
30. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145, at 646; A. LATMAN, supra note 6, at 783; Sobel,
supra note 6, at 53.
31. See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
a'd sub noma. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equal? divided
Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); A. LATMAN, supra note 66, at 793.
32. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
34. See note 78 infra.
35. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
36. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
37. Id at 310-11. The Rosemont court did not disregard the economic harm criterion en-
tirely. Rather, the court maintained that the publication of the biography had not lessened the
value of the copyrighted magazine articles. This position has been criticized for failing to take
into account the possibility that the copyright owners could have used the articles in publishing a
subsequent biography of their own. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145 at 646-47; Sobel,
supra note 6, at 57.
38. 366 F.2d at 307.
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of fair use,39 commentators were quick to see that the decision repre-
sented an aberrational extension of the fair use doctrine.40 It is evident
that defendants' copying of the magazine articles about Hughes did not
constitute fair use4 ' within the traditional definition of that trouble-
some term.42 The decision is best understood as the adoption of a direct
public interest factor.43
The origin of this direct public interest qualification is not certain.
The court in Rosemont relied heavily on the constitutional purpose of
the copyright statute,' but because public interest traditionally has not
been recognized as one of the express criteria for determining the avail-
ability of the fair use defense,45 it seems doubtful that this innovation
can be said to stem from the copyright clause of the Constitution.46 In
addition to setting forth the purpose for copyright, the copyright clause
specifically empowers Congress to grant "to Authors. . .the exclusive
Right to their respective writings."'47 In light of the legislative history of
the Copyrights Act48 and the fact that the fair use doctrine has been
codified,4 9 it must be presumed that the traditional judicial interpreta-
tion and application of the fair-use doctrine represents what Congress
believes to be the proper balance between the constitutional purpose of
promoting the arts and sciences and the broad power conferred by the
Constitution for serving that purpose.50
Another possible source of the direct public interest qualification,
one that is not within the power of Congress to affect, is the first
amendment.5' To the extent that the public's right to be fully informed
39. Id at 306-11.
40. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 9.24, at 28.28; Sobel, supra note 6, at 54.
41. See note 7 supra. There can be little doubt that the unauthorized use of the Hughes
material had a detrimental effect on its future economic value.
42. In Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939), the court stated that
"the issue of fair use. . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
43. See Sobel, supra note 6, at 61.
44. See 366 F.2d at 307.
45. See note 29 suora.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quoted in note I supra.
47. Id
48. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); S. REP,. No. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. REP. No. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
49. Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §
107 (West 1977)).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, § 2 provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
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regarding matters of general import is threatened by the literal applica-
tion of the copyright laws, the first amendment may be invoked to pro-
tect the free dissemination of information and commentary on public
issues.5 2 Such an extrapolation of the first amendment would be consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's interpretation and effectuation of the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
5 3
The Supreme Court has revealed an intent to construe strictly any
law that might have a chilling effect on the first amendment "'in its
attempt to secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources.' - Likewise, the Court has in-
dicated, by implication, that in order for the express guarantees of free
speech and press to have any real meaning, a fundamental right to re-
ceive such information must be recognized." These principles reveal
the clear intent of the Supreme Court to remove any unnecessary
shackles from the first amendment. 6 Applying these principles to the
copyright laws, the primary issue becomes one of determining to what
52. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d at 311 (Lombard, C.J.,
concurring). But Sf McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court dismissed defendants' first amendment argument, insofar as it was distin-
guishable from traditional fair use defense, as "flying in the face of established law").
53. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
55. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). The Court's holding, only im-
plicit in the majority opinion, was expressly formulated by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion. Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), defendants were sued for libel
after publishing a political advertisement that allegedly contained inaccurate information con-
cerning plaintiff. The Court reversed the judgment in plaintiff's favor because there had been no
showing that prior to publication defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the infor-
mation was false. The Court held that without proof of scienter such a judgment would have a
chilling effect on first amendment rights. Id at 266.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), defendants were sued for violating plaintiff's statu-
tory right of privacy by reporting that a highly fictionalized play accurately portrayed an actual
experience in plaintiff's life. Again, however, the Court reversed the judgment in plaintiffs favor,
holding that "the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the
[statutory right of privacy] to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of
proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth." Id at 387-88.
In Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court declared unconstitutional §
305(a) of the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-793, §
305(a), 76 Stat. 833, that required addressees of "Communist political propaganda" to submit a
written request for delivery. The Court held that the statute was "an unconstitutional abridgment
of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 381 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). In his concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan emphasized that the addressees were asserting "First Amendment
claims in their own right," claims premised on the implicit fundamental right to receive publica-
tions, a right that is necessary to make the express guarantees of free speech and press meaningful.
Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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extent the rights of the copyright owner will be allowed to encroach
upon the "community right to hear."
5 7
It is quite unlikely that the first amendment was intended to nega-
tive completely the protection afforded all copyrighted material that
happens to be of interest to the public. 8 Indeed, a broad application of
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech in the public inter-
est area would undermine the very foundation of the Copyrights Act,
for copyrighted works typically are of interest to the public in one way
or another. To allow unrestricted infringement of these works would
result in the destruction of the economic incentive to create, publish
and distribute copyrightable materials that might in any way be of
benefit to the public welfare, and the "community right to hear"
eventually would become a right without meaning. 9
Such a crippling application of the first amendment to the copy-
right laws is, however, unnecessary. The historical qualifications of a
copyright owner's exclusive rights more often than not have been uti-
lized successfully to achieve a proper balance between the public's
interest in the growth of learning and culture and the copyright owner's
interest in preserving the economic value of his work.6" Because the
facts and ideas set forth in a copyrighted work are not in themselves
copyrightable,61 and because the copyrighted work itself may be used
in a fair and reasonable manner,62 the public's interests can usually be
served without depriving the copyright owner of his just remun-
eration.6 3
There are certain types of copyrighted materials, however, that
cannot be reduced to an assortment of facts or ideas because it is the
form of expression and not merely the substance that is meaningful.64
57. See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 989 (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28
(1965)) (the first amendment intended to define "a community right to hear" and not "an individ-
ual right to speak").
58. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) ("the right to communicate
information of public interest is not 'unconditional' ").
59. See Sobel, su~vra note 6, at 78-79 (public interest best served ultimately by sound system
of copyright protection).
60. For a general review of the fair use case law, see 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145, and
Cohen, supra note 3.
61. See A. LATMAN, supra note 6; Sobel, supra note 6.
62. See M. NIMMER, supra note 7.
63. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH
CONG., IST SESS., supra note 3, at 5-6.
64. In other words, the copyrighted material cannot be used in a distilled form and maintain
its value; the part which is to be appropriated must be copied verbatim. The fair use doctrine
allows for this type of use provided certain criteria are satisfied. See note 29 supra. If the fair
use criteria cannot be satisfied, however, the copyright owner's monopoly becomes absolute.
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As examples, Professor Nimmer lists such graphic works as the Mona
Lisa, Michelangelo's Moses and the Zapruder film of President Ken-
nedy's assassination;65 arguably this category should include certain lit-
erary works as well.66 For works of this nature, there is potentially a
direct conflict between the copyright owner's quasi-monopolistic rights
and the public's right to the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion and commentary because under the traditional interpretation of
the fair use doctrine the copyright owner has the right to prohibit any
use of his copyrighted material that might diminish its future marketa-
bility.67 When traditional copyright qualifications are inadequate to
protect the public's interests, a direct public interest qualification, pre-
mised on the first amendment, should be invoked to prevent the sup-
pression of information or commentary that might enhance the public
welfare, but that cannot be made available to the public in an effective
manner without the use of previously copyrighted material.68
The first essential element of this direct public interest qualifica-
tion is that there must be some legitimate purpose for using the copy-
righted material.69 Generally, this requirement should be easy to
satisfy. Though it is possible that copyrighted material may be appro-
priated for an improper purpose, such as commercial exploitation, any
use of the copyrighted material that is intended to contribute to the
intrinsic value of the copying work should qualify as a legitimate pur-
pose.
Obviously, if the subsequent researcher cannot accomplish his purpose in an effective manner
without a proscribed use of the copyrighted material, the public will be denied the benefit of that
researcher's work. The problem is not that the copyrighted material is not directly available to
the public, but that the public may be denied the benefit to be gained by a particular use of the
copyrighted material in a subsequent work.
65. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 9.232 at 28.22-28.23. The unauthorized use of the
Zapruder film was the subject of litigation in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. Provided that verbatim copying is necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate
purpose, there is no logical reason for excluding literary works. This should not create problems
in the areas of poetry, fiction or drama since the purpose for using such works can be strictly
scrutinized. For instance, limited quotation from such works for the purpose of literary criticism
and parody has been allowed under the traditional fair use doctrine. See Cohen, supra note 3.
But wholesale appropriation probably would not be allowed even under the more liberal direct
public interest qualification because such a use would serve the same purpose as the original, and
thus the only motivation for such copying would be personal profit.
67. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
68. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Goldstein, supra note 11, at 994.
69. Cf. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938)
(portion of scientific treatise appropriated for purely commercial purpose of promoting the sale of
defendant's cigarettes held not legitimate purpose).
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The trial court in Meeropol v. Nizer, for example, expressed no
difficulty in finding that there was a legitimate purpose for using the
Rosenbergs' letters.7" The court indicated that the letters themselves
were part of the historical record of this important event and that any
serious discussion of the case would be incomplete without some refer-
ence to them.7 In addition, the trial court found that the letters clearly
were used to describe the thoughts and feelings of the Rosenbergs in
relation to their trial and sentence.72
On the other hand, the court of appeals in Meeropol expressed
considerable doubt regarding the legitimacy of defendants' purpose for
using the letters.73 Noting that the letters were prominently featured in
promotional material for defendants' book,7 4 the court found that the
letters may have been used for purposes of commercial exploitation.75
It seems, however, that the court was confusing commercial motivation
with commercial exploitation.76 As the court conceded, the mere fact
that an unauthorized use of copyrighted material is commercially moti-
vated is not a sufficient reason for disallowing an otherwise valid fair
use defense.77 The specific promotional activities are merely elements
of the overall commercial motivation 8.7 The use of the letters in promo-
tional advertisements was not alone a proper basis for questioning ei-
ther the legitimacy of using the letters in the book or the intrinsic value
of the book itself.
The second essential element of the direct public interest qualifica-
tion is that the copying work be of interest to the public. 79 This does
not mean that the copying work must represent a significant scientific
or cultural achievement; indeed, the trial court in Meeropol found that
The Implosion Conspiracy could be of some benefit to the public wel-
fare even though it was written for a popular audience and with a
70. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
71. Id at 1212, 1214.
72. Id at 1214.
73. 560 F.2d at 1069-71.
74. Id at 1071.
75. Id
76. Id at 1069.
77. Id
78. The copyright system is based on providing an economic incentive for the creation and
publication of new works. The Second Circuit has expressly recognized this underlying premise.
See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d at 307; Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
79. This is related to the traditional requirements of the fair use doctrine, see note 29 suprg
and it is of special importance to the direct public interest qualification. See text accompanying
notes 44-59 supra.
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commercial motivation. 0 So long as there is some public interest in
the copying work, this requirement is satisfied.
The final and most critical element is necessity: only if the purpose
for using the copyrighted material can be accomplished by no means
other than exact appropriation can the unauthorized use come within
the sanction of the direct public interest qualification. If other means
exist, then the interests of the public can be adequately protected with-
out invoking any additional qualification of the copyright owner's
rights. The trial court in Meeropol found that the only effective means
of using the letters to accomplish the intended purposes was to quote
from them directly.8' In so finding, the court expressly dismissed the
suggestion that the thoughts and feelings embodied in the letters could
have been presented effectively without copying their expression verba-
tim.8 2 In other words, the court found that verbatim copying was
necessary to protect adequately the public's interest in hearing what
Mr. Nizer and his publishers had to say about the Rosenberg case.
The propriety of the trial court in Meeropol finding necessity on
defendants' motion for summary judgment is, however, open to ques-
tion. Though there is no reason to question the legitimacy or sincerity
of defendants' purposes in using the letters, 3 it would seem that rea-
sonable men might differ concerning whether verbatim copying of the
letters was really necessary to the accomplishment of those purposes.
The defendants first asserted necessity in the use of the letters as histor-
ical facts in themselves.8 4 It must be conceded that quotation would be
necessary if the letters were found to be an integral component of the
historical event. But certainly it is not clear that the letters could prop-
erly be considered analogous to historical facts.8 5 Because the letters of
80. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For example, the trial court found that
Nizer's book could serve as valuable source material for future studies of the Rosenbergs' case.
81. Id at 1214.
82. Id at 1212. The trial court also found that the use of the letters was properly limited to
the accomplishment of the purposes. Id at 1214.
83. Defendants set out the following purposes for using the letters in their book:
(1) as historical facts in themselves for the reason that they were an integral part of an
international campaign to secure clemency; (2) to give the reader an insight into those
two public figures as individuals. . . whose writing achieved a lasting eloquence; and (3)
to provide an emotional base to support Nizer's own view that capital punishment in that
case was unwarranted.
Petition for Certiorari at 6, Nizer v. Meeropol, 98 S. Ct. 927 (1978) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
84. See note 83 supra.
85. Judge Tyler, the trial judge originally assigned to this case, expressed doubt concerning
whether "letters stand on the same footing as 'historical facts', which are the product of research
and in turn form the basis for subsequent works." 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This
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public figures are copyrightable,16 while historical facts are not, 7 it
would seem that the two are not analogous. If they were, the letters
could be used without restriction, and the copyright on them would be
meaningless.
Defendants' second alleged purpose was to provide insight into the
character of the Rosenbergs.88 Direct quotation from the letters may
indeed have been the most effective means of accomplishing that pur-
pose, but whether it was the only effective means is not so certain. It is
probably true that reference to certain of the Rosenbergs' letters would
be a necessary element in any serious book on their trial; 9 whether
such references would require verbatim copying, however, is a genuine
issue of fact that should be decided by the trier of fact after careful
comparison of the materials in question. Particularly with regard to
literary works, only in the most unusual cases will the need for exact
copying be so evident as to warrant summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.
The same holds true for defendants' third purpose,90 the establish-
ment of an emotional basis for the author's view on capital punishment
in the Rosenbergs' case. Though the quotations may have heightened
the emotional impact of this theme, only a careful examination of the
two works can reveal whether the same sentiments could not have been
expressed effectively by paraphrasing the content of the letters.
Thus it appears that even if Meeropol had been decided in a juris-
diction in which the direct public interest qualification was recognized,
because the necessity element raised a genuine issue of fact the court of
appeals' decision to remand would have been appropriate. This is not
to say that the use of the letters in this instance was not necessary. On
the contrary, there is good reason to believe that verbatim copying was
the only effective means of accomplishing at least one, if not all, of the
author's purposes for using the letters. But not until this issue is finally
resolved can the direct public interest qualification be invoked as a de-
was one reason Judge Tyler denied defendants' original motion for summary judgment. Judge
Gagliardi, who succeeded Judge Tyler when he resigned from the bench, however, went so far as
to indicate that the letters were at least analogous to historical facts. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1211
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
86. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Note, PersonalLetters.: In
Need of a Law of Their Own, 44 IowA L. REv. 705 (1959).
87. 560 F.2d at 1070. See also A. LATMAN,upra note 6, at 784-85.
88. See note 83 supra.
89. Even Judge Tyler was willing to concede that some reference to the letters would be
required. 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
90. See note 83 supra.
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fense. Unfortunately, in Meeropol the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, by restricting its analysis of the case to the strict criteria of the
traditional fair use doctrine, showed no interest in recognizing the pub-
lic interest qualification. 9' Because the fair use doctrine was never in-
tended to benefit the public welfare at the expense of the copyright
owner's economic interests,92 the court could not so easily dismiss the
possibility of economic harm to the copyright owner.93 And, having
found the possibility of such harm to exist, the court of appeals was
compelled to reverse the district court's summary judgment award.
If on remand defendants' use of the letters can be proven to have
diminished the future marketability of the copyrighted work, then the
fair use defense will be of no avail to defendants even if it can also be
proven that the copyrighted material could not be used in an effective
manner without infringing the copyright.94 If this is to be the case, the
public's right to hear a critical part of Nizer's discussion of the Rosen-
berg trial will be subordinated to the Meeropols' economic interest in
exerting total control over the copyrighted letters.95 It is to avoid such a
constitutionally anomalous result96 that the courts need to recognize
this direct public interest factor as a legitimate and necessary qualifica-
tion of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
Provided the material is of such a type that the public's interest
therein cannot be adequately served without infringing the copyright,
91. See text accompanying notes 80 & 81 supra.
The court attempted to distinguish its earlier decision in Rosemont on the grounds that plain-
tiffs in that case had not come into court with clean hands and that the amount of copying in
Rosemont was quantitatively less than that in Meeropol. 560 F.2d at 1069. It seems clear, how-
ever, that by unequivocally relying on the strict criteria of the fair use doctrine in Meeropol, the
court was implicitly rejecting the underlying basis of the Rosemont decision.
92. See generall, cases cited note 10 supra.
93. "A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work tends to diminish or
prejudice the potential sale of plaintiffs work." 560 F.2d at 1070; see note 10 and text accompany-
ing notes 32-40 supra.
The trial court did not disregard the economic harm factor entirely. It merely held that
economic harm was not necessarily the determinative issue. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214-15
(S,D.N.Y. 1976).
Because of the court of appeals' decision in this case, it is doubtful that the issue of necessity
in Meeropol will be litigated on remand. Limited by law of the case principles to the traditional
copyright qualifications, defendants probably will not be allowed to litigate the issue of necessity
directly, though it may come into play as a collateral issue in the fair use defense. Nor is it likely
that the issue will be raised again on appeal, as the facts of the case are such that the traditional
fair use defense should result in a judgment in defendants' favor. Because of the nature of de-
fendants' use, it seems doubtful that plaintiffs will be able to prove a likelihood of economic harm.
94. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
95. Though the public may have access to the Rosenbergs' letters, they will not have access
to that part of Nizer's discussion of the case that depends on the use of the letters.
96. See text accompanying notes 51-57, 67 & 68 supra.
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the benefit to be gained from allowing the free dissemination of infor-
mation and commentary far outweighs the possible economic harm to
the copyright owner. The public's right to be informed must be the
ultimate concern. "We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess
in which the public can be checkmated.
9 7
STEVEN L. HOARD
Corporations-Singer v. Magnavox Co.: An Expansion of
Fiduciary Duty in Freezeout Mergers Under the Delaware
Long-Form Merger Statute
Under the law of some states a corporation holding a majority eq-
uity interest in another company may merge the two corporations and
provide in the merger agreement that certain shareholders be paid cash,
rather than securities in the resulting entity, for their interest in the old
corporation.' In these mergers, denominated "freezeouts,"2 the fiduci-
ary duties governing the relationship between majority and minority
stockholders are rooted in state law In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,4 a
recent decision concerning shareholder fiduciary duties, the Delaware
97. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675, 679 (Ist Cir. 1967).
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
901, 902 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977).
2. Freezeouts can occur in various contexts. For example, merger freezeouts include the
situation in which the controlling shareholders of a public corporation who wish to "go private"
form a second company and capitalize it with their equity interest in the public corporation. This
new "parent" then merges with its public subsidiary with the terms of the merger providing for the
elimination of the equity interest of the minority, often on a cash-out basis. A second type of
freezeout occurs when one corporation, by tender offer or otherwise, attempts to acquire the ma-
jority interest in a business with which it was previously unaffiliated. After the requisite propor-
tional interest is obtained, the acquiring corporation merges the acquired company with itself or
its wholly-owned subsidiary, the terms of the merger providing for the elimination of the minority
shareholders of the target corporation. See Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 491-96 (1976).
3. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held
that in short-form mergers the fiduciary relationship between stockholders is a matter of state
concern. Specifically, Santa Fe rejected the contention that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), require a proper
business purpose to exist before a short-form merger comporting with state law will be valid under
federal law. The Court suggested that the reasoning behind its holding is also applicable to long-
form mergers. 430 U.S. at 478.
4. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
